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DODGING A BULLET, BUT OPENING OLD 
WOUNDS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Ronald J. Bacigal • 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Anthony Amsterdam once predicted that judicial 
recognition of a sliding scale of probable cause would produce 
much more slide than scale. 1 Until the decision in Winston v. Lee,2 
that prediction proved accurate because the United States 
Supreme Court had consistently "scaled down" the level of prob-
able cause required for a constitutional search.3 This scaled ap-
proach to the fourth amendment assumed that a hierarchy of 
privacy interests existed, which were to be balanced against a hi-
erarchy of governmental interests.4 In theory, this balancing pro-
cess would remain neutral because some privacy interests would 
outweigh certain governmental interests, just as other govern-
mental interests would prevail over specific rights of privacy. In 
practice, however, the Court regularly accorded greater weight to 
• Professor of Law, University of Richmond. 
1 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394 
(1974). 
2 105 S. Ct. 161 l (1985). 
3 The investigative-stop cases, from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (l 968) to United 
States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), best illustrate the consistent watering 
down of the probable cause requirements necessary to authorize intrusions by gov-
ernment officials. In Sharpe, the Court permitted an extended investigatory deten-
tion when the delay resulted in part from the evasive actions of the defendant's 
accomplice. Shmpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1576. The arresting officer in that case had "de-
cided to make an 'investigative stop' " because the pickup truck driven by Sharpe's 
accomplice "was riding low in the rear" and appeared to be "heavily loaded." See 
id. at 157 l. The Court approved this stop, noting that the officer possessed "clear 
justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited investigation." Id. at 1574 
n.3. Justice Brennan disagreed with this conclusion and observed that the stop may 
have been made because the officer who had been following the defendants in an 
unmarked car "was about to run out of gas." See id. at 1588 & n.9 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 1583-84 (Marshall, J., concurring) (criticizing Court's ap-
proval of the stop). 
4 See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Fbcc The Rise and Fall of Pmbable Cause, 
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 766. See generally Greenberg, The Ba/a//(e of Interests Theory and 
the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 
61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1016-35 (1973) (discussing the magnitude of various gov-
ernmental and privacy interests); McKenna, The Co11stit11/io11al Protection of Pri1•ate Pa-
pen: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth A111r11d111ent, 53 IND. LJ. 55, 67-91 (1978) 
(advocating a hierarchy of privacy interests). 
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the alleged governmental interest, 5 and the theoretically neutral 
balancing process uniformly produced cases that diluted fourth 
amendment protections. As a result, several critics suggested 
that the Court was manipulating the balancing process in order 
to achieve the desired result of aiding law enforcement agencies.6 
The Winston Court appeared to answer this criticism by dem-
onstrating that a sliding scale of probable cause or reasonable-
ness 7 was not "a one way street,"8 which always favored law 
enforcement interests.9 The result in Winston revealed that in an 
appropriate situation, a scaled approach to the constitutionality 
of searches and seizures could produce a decision favoring a 
heightened protection of privacy. 10 Winston might thus be consid-
ered an indication of the Supreme Court's evenhanded applica-
tion of a balancing-of-interests process without regard to whether 
the substantive result favored the prosecution or the defense. 
Such a view is superficial, however, because the case more accu-
rately represents a continuation of the Court's drift away from an 
emphasis on process and toward the previously discarded prac-
tice of reading substantive value judgments into the reasonable-
ness clause of the fourth amendment. 
The Winston case involved a defendant who had been 
5 Justice Brennan has characterized the balancing process as one "in which the 
judicial thumb apparently will be planted firmly on the law-enforcement side of the 
scales." United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1593 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
6 Courts often "misconstrue the fourth amendment and fudge the standards of 
probable cause" to avoid application of the exclusionary rule. Wilkey, A Call for 
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 62 JUDICATURE 351, 356 (l 979); see also Note, For-
malism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 982-83 (1977) (criticizing the Court's treatment 
of the exclusionary rule and the unpredictable nature of the balancing process). 
7 A "sliding scale of probable cause" and a "flexible concept of reasonable-
ness" are merely alternative expressions ofa single methodology-the balancing of 
conflicting governmental and individual interests. See infra notes 162-168 and ac-
companying text. 
8 Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
!J See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1620; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(l 967). In Berger, the Court struck down a New York statute permitting wiretaps. 
Id. at 44. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart indicated that he would permit 
some electronic eavesdropping. Id. at 69 (Stewart, J., concurring). Nevertheless, 
he stated that severe intrusions upon privacy, such as wiretaps, should require "the 
most precise and rigorous standard of probable cause." Id. 
10 In addition to the Winston decision, the Court recently held that the use of 
deadly force to seize a fleeing, unarmed felon constitutes an unreasonable seizure 
notwithstanding the existence of probable cause to make an arrest. See Tennessee 
v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1700-01 (1985). But see United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. 
Ct. 1568 ( 1985). Sharpe, which was decided a week before Gamer, approved a ques-
tionable investigative stop. See supra note 3 (discussing Sharpe). 
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wounded during an attempted robbery. 11 The suspect, bran-
dishing a firearm, had approached a storekeeper who was closing 
his shop. 12 The storekeeper then drew his own gun and fired at 
his assailant. 13 After an exchange of gunfire, 14 the would-be rob-
ber fled the scene. 15 The police soon arrived and found Rudolph 
Lee approximately eight blocks from the location of the shoot-
ing. 16 He had apparently suffered a gunshot wound to the 
chest. 17 The officers arrested Lee, and he was subsequently iden-
tified by the shopkeeper, who had also been shot during the gun 
battle. 18 Lee was charged with attempted robbery, use of a fire-
arm during a felony, and malicious wounding. 19 
The prosecution then sought an order requiring Lee to un-
dergo surgery for the removal of what appeared to be a bullet 
lodged in his left shoulder.20 After several evidentiary hear-
ings,21 the trial judge ordered surgical removal of the object, and 
the state supreme court affirmed.22 The Federal courts subse-
quently refused to enjoin the surgery.23 Immediately prior to the 
operation, however, an X ray revealed that the suspected bullet 
would be more difficult to remove than previously thought.24 
Nonetheless, the state courts denied Lee's petition for a rehear-
ing.25 This time, however, a Federal district court enjoined the 
11 See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1614. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. During the gun battle, the shopkeeper, Ralph Watkinson, was shot in the 
legs. Id. He also noticed that the defendant had been hit in the left side. See id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. The police took Lee to the hospital where the shopkeeper was being 
treated. See id. The shopkeeper identified Lee in the emergency room. See id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. The prosecution hoped to match the markings on the bullet in Lee's 
shoulder with the markings on a test bullet fired from the shopkeeper's gun. See id. 
21 See id. At the initial hearing, the prosecution's expert stated "that the surgical 
procedure would take 45 minutes and would involve a three to four percent chance 
of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of permanent nerve damage, and 
a one-tenth of one percent chance of death." Id. Subsequently, the same doctor 
testified that the projectile was closer to Lee's skin than he had originally thought. 
Id. Consequently, the doctor believed the operation "could be performed under 
local anesthesia, and would result in 'no danger.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
22 Id. at 1615. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. The X ray showed that the bullet was located "deep in muscular tissue in 
[Lee's] chest, substantially deeper than had been thought when the state court 
granted the motion to compel surgery." Id. As a result, a general anesthetic would 
be required. Id. 
25 Id. 
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operation,26 and the Fourth Circuit upheld the injunction.27 The 
United States Supreme Court then granted the state's petition 
for certiorari. 28 
The Court began its opinion in Winston by "[p]utting to one 
side the procedural protections of the warrant requirement. " 29 
The parties agreed that the defendant had received "a full mea-
sure of procedural protections"30 and that the state had met the 
"ordinary" standard of probable cause for a search.31 "Notwith-
standing the existence of probable cause"32 and the state's full 
compliance with the procedures required by the warrant clause, 
the Court found that the reasonableness clause of the fourth 
amendment demands "a more substantial justification" than 
probable cause.33 The Court viewed this higher level of justifica-
tion as a substantive requirement of the reasonableness clause-a 
requirement unrelated to the procedural standards of the war-
rant clause.34 Thus, the Court refused to permit the state to in-
vade a suspect's body in a quest for incriminating evidence.35 
This recognition of the substantive values contained within 
the reasonableness clause will focus new attention upon the long-
standing contoversy over the relationship of the fourth amend-
26 Lee v. Winston,"551 F. Supp. 247, 253-61 (E.D. Va. 1982), ajf'd, 717 F.2d 888 
(4th Cir. 1983), ajf'd, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985). 
27 Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), ajf'd, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985). 
28 Winston v. Lee, 466 U.S. 935 (1984). 
29 Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1616. 
30 Id. at 1618. The defendant had been afforded "a full adversary presentation 
and appellate review." Id. at 1618 n.6. The Supreme Court refused to decide 
whether "such special procedural protections" are constitutionally required when a 
state seeks to compel a surgical search. Id. 
31 Id. at 1618. 
32 Id. at 1617. The Court observed that "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into 
an individual's body for evidence ... implicates expectations of privacy and secur-
ity of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to 
produce evidence of a crime." Id. at 1616. 
33 Id. at 1620. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, characterized the intru-
sion on Lee's privacy interests as "severe." Id. He stated that the proposed "sur-
gery involve[d] a virtually total divestment of [Lee's] ordinary control over surgical 
probing beneath his skin." Id. at 1619. Such an intrusion, Justice Brennan con-
cluded, "would be 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1620. 
34 See id. at 1616. 
35 See id. at 1620. Although Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Court's judg-
ment, he stated that he would uphold a "detention of an individual if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that natural bodily functions will disclose the pres-
ence of contraband materials secreted internally." Id. at 1620 (Burger, CJ., concur-
ring). Approximately three months later, a majority of the Court explicitly 
approved this type of seizure. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 105 S. 
Ct. 3304, 3312 (1985). 
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ment's two conjunctive clauses::ii; Is the reasonableness clause a 
"blank check," which the Court may fill in with the substantive 
values it considers appropriate, or is constitutional reasonable-
ness defined by the "bright-line" procedural requirements of the 
warrant clause? 
I. OF BRIGHT LINES AND BLANK CHECKS 
The Supreme Court has often acknowledged that it faces a 
dilemma when interpreting the fourth amendment. While the 
police sometimes need bright-line rules for guidance and cer-
tainty, 37 they must also be accorded the flexibility necessary to 
respond appropriately to the variety of factual situations con-
fronting them.38 The recent case of Pennsylvania v. Mimms 39 best 
illustrates that the Court is hopelessly caught between the need 
for clear-cut principles and the desire for on-the-job flexibility. 
In Mimms, the Supreme Court considered a police practice of 
"order[ing] all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course 
whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation. "40 The 
36 The fourth amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822, 825 (1982). The Court has 
observed, "A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have 
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual 
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront." Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Professor Lafave 
states: "[T]he rules governing search and seizure are more in need of greater clar-
ity than greater sophistication. . . . [A]n ounce of application is worth a ton of 
abstraction." Lafave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect Worid: On Drawing "Bright 
Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Lafave, Imperfect World]; see also Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fow·th Amend-
ment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 333 (1973) (search-and-seizure doc-
trine must be "easily understandable by the persons sought to be deterred"); 
Lafave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication·· Versus "Standardized Procedures··: The Robinson Die 
lemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 141 [hereinafter cited as Lafave, ··case-b)•-CaseAdju-
dication "] (fourth amendment rules should be "expressed in terms that are readily 
applicable by the police"). 
38 See United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 239 (1983). In Sharpe, Chief Justice Burger stated, "A court 
. . . should . . . consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situ-
ation, and in such cases the. court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guess-
ing." Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. at 1576. 
3!> 434 U.S. 106 (1977). 
40 Id. at 110. 
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Court addressed only this general practice and refused to inquire 
whether the police officer had any suspicion that this particular 
motorist was likely to be armed and dangerous.41 In upholding 
the practice, the Court relied upon statistical evidence showing 
" 'that a significant percentage of murders of police officers oc-
curs when the officers are making traffic stops.' " 42 
Thus, the Mimms Court balanced the generalized govern-
mental interest in protecting the police from attack by armed mo-
torists against the generalized privacy interests of motorists as a 
class.43 In holding that all motorists must obey an order to exit 
their automobiles after a lawful stop,44 the Court attempted to 
treat all similarly situated defendants alike and to give "bright-
line" guidance to police officers in the field. As Justice Stevens 
noted in dissent, however, this uniformity was achieved by sacri-
ficing all flexibility: 
The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the ar-
resting officer is so universal that his safety is always a reason-
able justification for ordering a driver out of his car. The 
commuter on his way home to dinner, the parent driving chil-
dren to school, the tourist circling the Capitol, or the family on 
a Sunday afternoon outing hardly pose the same threat as a 
driver curbed after a high-speed chase through a high-crime 
area late at night. Nor is it universally true that the driver's 
interest in remaining in the car is negligible. A woman stopped 
at night may fear for her own safety; a person in poor health 
may object to standing in the cold or rain; another who left 
home in haste to drive children or spouse to school or to the 
train may not be fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents 
no possible threat of violence may regard the police command 
as nothing more than an arrogant and unnecessary display of 
authority. Whether viewe~_from the standpoint of the officer's 
interest in his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not be-
ing required to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly ob-
vious that the millions of traffic stops that occur every year are 
not fungible.45 
Justice Stevens's preference for an "individualized inquiry into 
41 See id. at 109. Indeed, the state conceded that "the officer had no reason to 
suspect foul play from the particular driver at the time of the stop, there having 
been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behavior." Id. 
42 Id. at 110 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (l 973)). 
43 See id. at 110-l l. 
44 See id. at l l l n.6. 
45 Id. at 120-2 l (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the particular facts justifying every police intrusion"46 represents 
the ultimate in flexibility and reflects the traditional judicial prefer-
ence for adjudicative facts, rather than legislative facts such as the 
statistical evidence cited by the majority.47 Such an approach, how-
ever, fails to consider fully the institutional role of the Supreme 
Court. The Court controls its own docket and is free to choose the 
particular factual situations in which to interpret the law. The 
Court's prime institutional task is to deal with issues of significant 
public interest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties in 
the relatively rare case in which certiorari is granted.48 Justice Ste-
vens is obviously correct in asserting that individual defendants do 
not regard themselves as fungible items to be manipulated for the 
general good of society.49 Nevertheless, the Court's role in protect-
ing the rights of individual citizens necessarily conflicts with its role 
in formulating broad policies and bright-line rules designed to pro-
vide clear guidance to law enforcement agencies.50 
The competing goals of certainty and flexibility, so important in 
regulating the police power, are also legitimate concerns when ad-
dressing the exercise of judicial power.51 Is the warrant clause a 
bright line, which limits and structures the Court's authority to in-
terpret the fourth amendment, or does the reasonableness clause 
46 Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
47 See Bacigal, supra note 4, at 784. 
48 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977). In Bounds, the Court stated: 
"[A] court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned 
with the correctness of the judgment below. Rather, review is generally granted 
only if a case raises an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential impor-
tance or conflicts with controlling precedent." Id.; see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 
600, 615 (1974) (public impact of case is important factor in discretionary review). 
49 One author has noted: "Without individuality, there is no function for pri-
vacy. When we become fungible goods to be manipulated by government, there 
can be no recognition of idiosyncracies, no private realms to husband against intru-
sion." Kurkland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn 1976, at 7, 36. 
50 See Amsterdam, supra note I, at 377. Professor Amsterdam states: 
The question remains at what level of generality and in what shape rules 
should be designed in order to encompass all that can be encompassed 
without throwing organization to the wolves. The question must be an-
swered with a due regard for the practical workings of the institutions 
that administer, and are governed by, any particular set of rules. 
Id. 
51 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 758-59 (Brennan,J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan criticized the Court's consistent 
application of "balancing tests" as "an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will." Id. at 
758 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He stated that "the 
Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to 
answer all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the 
social good." Id. at 759 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Furthermore, Justice Brennan maintained, "this Court has an obligation to provide 
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provide an ambiguous bequest of power (a blank check), which the 
Court may exercise as it deems appropriate? The language of the 
amendment itself is not dis positive because it seems to afford both a 
bright line and a blank check. The first clause of the amendment 
sets forth the blank check, acknowledging that some searches are 
reasonable and others are not.52 No definition of reasonableness is 
offered in this clause, however, and the Court must look to history 
and contemporary values in order to define the substantive content 
of the term. In contrast, the second clause of the amendment reads 
like a bright-line rule, setting forth specific requirements: the issu-
ance of a warrant, probable cause, oath or affirmation, and specific-
ity in describing the place to be searched and the items to be 
seized. 53 Thus, because the amendment provides both a bright line 
and a blank check, the Court must deal with the problem of recon-
ciling the two clauses. Consideration of this issue has produced va-
rying results during the long history of the fourth amendment. 
The Intent of the Framers 
If anything is clear about the history of the fourth amend-
ment, it is that the amendment did not spring forth from a purely 
abstract consideratiop of fundamental rights. 54 The amend-
some coherent framework to resolve such questions on the basis of more than a 
conclusory recitation of the results of a 'balancing test.' " Id. 
In addition, a distinction must be drawn between bright-line rules imposed by 
the Court to facilitate efficient administration of the law and bright-line rules de-
rived from the Constitution. See Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1709 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting difference between constitutional and "purely 
judicial ... limits on governmental action"). Indeed, the history of the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule exemplifies the need for such a distinction. In 1961, 
the Court recognized the exclusionary rule as constitutionally derived. See Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961). Nevertheless, the current Supreme Court char-
acterizes the rule as a judicially created device, which is not constitutionally man-
dated. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
52 See supra note 36 (setting forth language of fourth amendment). The Supreme 
Court recently explained its view of the amendment's first clause: "The Fourth 
Amendment is not, of course, a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but 
only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 
1568, 1573 (1985). 
53 See supra note 36. Some flexibility exists in defining the requirements _of the 
warrant clause. See Bacigal, supra note 4, at 768-76. Probable cause is at times a 
rigid standard and at other times a flexible concept. See id. Nevertheless, there is a 
difference, at least in degree, between the flexibility inherent in a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause and the flexibility of a free-floating standard of reasona-
bleness. Cf it~fra notes 157-170 and accompanying text (discussing blurring of 
distinction between determinations of probable cause and reasonableness). 
54 See N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79-105 (1937). More so than the other 
amendments, "the fourth amendment was the product of particular events that 
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ment's roots lie in the colonists' actual experience with general 
warrants and writs of assistance, which were used to enforce Brit-
ish restrictions on free trade.55 In an effort to extract increased 
revenues from the American Colonies, the British government 
enacted various measures to regulate colonial trade.56 These reg-
ulations were enforced by royal customs officers,57 who regularly 
entered and searched buildings with no formal authority other 
than the claim that their commissions as crown officers gave them 
the general power to search and seize. 58 When the colonists re-
sisted these practices, writs of assistance were issued, empower-
ing the customs officers to enlist the aid of constables and the 
militia. 59 The general warrants and writs of assistance relied 
upon by customs officers were alien in form to the modern search 
warrant. These early warrants required no probable cause; they 
did not specify a particular location to be searched; nor did they 
specify the items to be seized.6° Furthermore, the general war-
rants were neither limited in time nor returnable to the judiciary. 
These warrants and the writs of assistance were valid for the life 
of the sovereign and in fact were negotiable from one officer to 
another.61 
The colonists' hostility to these police tactics was based on 
two interrelated premises: first, the right of privacy was mean-
ingless and a man's home was not his castle so long as there was a 
breath of life in a customs officer; second, the customs officers 
possessed the unchecked power to act arbitrarily and oppres-
closely preceded the Constitution and the Bill of Rights." T. TAYLOR, Search, Seizure, 
and Suroeillance, in Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19, 19 (1969). 
Professor Taylor asserts that researchers "can find specified in the pages of history 
the abuses against which the fourth amendment was particularly directed." Id. See 
generally J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-48 ( 1966) 
(outlining the history of the fourth amendment). 
55 See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 30-32. 
56 See Bacigal, A Case for jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, l 5 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 791, 795 (1981). 
57 See c. UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION 15 (1960). Officers of men-of-war stationed in America were also sworn in as 
customs officers with authority to seize and prosecute violators of the trade acts. Id. 
at 39. The British Admiralty stationed 44 ships, ranging from sloops to 50-gun 
vessels, along the east coast in an effort to enforce the King's trade decrees. Id. 
58 J. l..ANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 31; see alw N. LAssoN, rnprn note 54, at 55 
(describing the practices of royal customs officials). 
5!1 N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 53-54. 
no Id. at 54. 
(i I See id. In addition, customs officials and naval officers were awarded a per-
centage of condemned seizures. C. UBBELOHDE, supra note 57, at 39. This incen-
tive caused heated competition between land-based customs officials and naval 
officers, leading lo a practice of "first come, first seize." Id. at 40. 
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sively.62 The blatant misuse of this power was demonstrated in 
one dramatic case in which a customs officer was called before a 
judge to answer for some minor offense.63 At the conclusion of 
the case, the customs officer arrogantly announced: "I will [now] 
show you a little of my power. I command you to permit me to 
search your house for uncustomed goods. " 64 
At a minimum, therefore, the fourth amendment must be 
seen as an attempt to prohibit the historical abuses associated 
with general warrants and writs of assistance. The first precedent 
for the fourth amendment was the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, 
which specifically addressed the issuance of general warrants: 
That general warrants whereby an officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a 
fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, 
or whose offense is not particularly described and supported 
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be 
granted.65 
The Virginia provision did not expound broad rights to reasonable 
security or privacy. It limited its coverage to general warrants and 
specifically provided only the following protections: (1) a definition 
of general warrants (lack of probable cause and particularity); (2) a 
characterization of such warrants as "grievous and oppressive"; and 
(3) a prohibition upon the issuance of such warrants. 
The initial draft of the fourth amendment submitted to Con-
gress was, like the Virginia approach, a limited prohibition of gen-
eral warrants: 
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, 
62 See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 34; N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 59-60. 
While popular lore emphasizes taxation without representation, "the means of en-
forcing the new taxes were as much an innovation in colonial policy and as much a 
threat to equality of treatment in the empire as the taxes themselves." Lovejoy, 
Rights Imply Equality: The Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 176.J./ 776, 16 
WM. & MARY Q 459, 460 (1959). 
63 See N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 60. James Otis described this case in his fa-
mous speech denouncing writs of assistance. See id. John Adams later observed: 
" '[Otis's speech] was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great 
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in 
1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself free.'" Id. at 59 (citation 
omitted). 
64 Id. at 60 (emphasis added). Recent dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule 
has caused the Supreme Court to denigrate the need to regulate police power. See 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918, 926 (1984). Criticism of the modern 
exclusionary rule, however, should not confuse the procedural device of excluding 
evidence with the historically recognized goal of regulating the discretionary power 
of law enforcement officers. 
65 N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 79 n.3 (citation omitted). 
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houses, papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants 
issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and not particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.66 
607 
This initial draft accomplished the same three purposes as the Vir-
ginia provision: (1) it defined general warrants (adding lack of an 
oath or affirmation to the elements of lack of probable cause and 
particularity); (2) it identified such warrants as grievous and oppres-
sive because they violate the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects; and (3) it prohibited the issu-
ance of such warrants. This prohibition of general warrants because 
they violate fundamental rights of the people may presuppose-but 
does not create-an independent right to privacy and security. In 
this context, the reference to the general right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects merely explains 
why general warrants are improper. Thus, "the general principle 
was stated merely as a basis for the minor premise condemning gen-
eral warrants and . . . the abuse attempted to be prevented was that 
of general warrants only."67 
Had the fourth amendment been approved in its initial form it 
would have prohibited only the issuance of general warrants, and it 
would have had the same limited significance as the third amend-
ment's prohibition of the quartering of soldiers in private dwell-
ings.68 Both the third and fourth amendments would be handy to 
have around to prevent the recurrence of particular practices, but 
neither amendment would have any far-reaching effect. Consider, 
however, the ambiguities created if a reasonableness clause had 
been grafted onto the third amendment: 
[The right of the people to be secure in their houses shall not 
be violated by the unreasonable quartering of soldiers, and] 
[n]o soldier shall . . . be quartered in any house . . . but in a 
manner prescribed by law.69 
How would a court interpret such a provision? Could the quarter-
ing of soldiers be unreasonable even if prescribed by law? 
In fact, such a general statement was added to the fourth 
66 Id. at 101. 
67 Id. at 81 n.10. This was the interpretation given to the Pennsylvania provision 
on search and seizure. See id. at 81. The Pennsylvania and Virginia provisions 
served as models for the fourth amendment. See infra notes 78-79 and accompany-
ing text. 
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. III. The third amendment provides, "No soldier 
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the 
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id. 
69 Id. 
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amendment as a separate clause, and therein lies the origin of the 
reasonableness clause/warrant clause controversy. The process 
through which this general clause was added to the fourth amend-
ment provides little meaningful insight into the intent of the fram-
ers. 70 The original draft71 was objected to because of an error in 
phraseology, and the amendment was reworded to read as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 72 
Congressman Benson, the chairman of the committee to arrange 
the amendments, objected to the phrase "by warrants issuing. " 73 He 
thought this provision too limited and proposed altering it to read, 
"and no warrant shall issue."74 Although his proposal was initially 
defeated, it was ultimately incorporated into the final version of the 
amendment.75 
Benson's proposal effectively split the amendment into two 
clauses, and according to some historians, "[t]he general right of 
security from unreasonable search and seizure was given a sanction 
of its own and the amendment thus intentionally given a broader 
scope."76 Whether this was truly the intent of all, some, or none of 
the drafters cannot be ascertained.77 At the time of its adoption, 
70 See N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 101-03. 
71 The original draft of the fourth amendment provided as follows: "The right 
of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not 
be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized." Id. at IO I. 
72 See id. (emphasis added). 
73 Id. (citation omitted). 
74 Id. (citation omitted). 
75 See id. The House of Representatives actually voted down a motion to phrase 
the amendment in its present form. See id. When Benson reported the version of 
the amendments agreed upon by the House, however, the clause appeared in the 
form the House had previously rejected. Id. The House failed to notice the altera-
tion. Id. at 102. The Senate later adopted the amendment in its present form, and 
it was ratified by the states. Id. at l 02-03; see also J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 41-
42 (discussing Benson's part in the adoption of the fourth amendment). Thus, "[i]t 
cannot be maintained ... that the Fourth Amendment as it is now worded is not 
properly a part of the Constitution." N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 102; see also supra 
note 36 (present language of the fourth amendment). 
76 N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 103. 
77 See Amsterdam, supra note l, at 397-98. It is fallacious to consider the framers 
"a collection of bodies having but one head" and to assume that they reached but 
one true consensus. Id. at 398. Professor Amsterdam observes, "The agreement of 
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there were two influential precedents for the fourth amendment: 
the Virginia model, which merely prohibited general warrants, and 
the Pennsylvania provision, 78 which spoke of a broad right to be free 
of unreasonable searches and seizures.79 The Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, however, used the term "therefore" to connect the broad 
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures with the pro-
hibition of general warrants.80 Thus, in spite of its broadly worded 
premise, the Pennsylvania provision was still merely a prohibition of 
general warrants, as were the Virginia model and the original draft 
of the fourth amendment. As ultimately adopted, however, the 
fourth amendment connected the broad right to be free of unrea-
sonable searches with the specifics of the warrant clause by substi-
tuting the word "and" in place of "therefore." This change from a 
single-barreled prohibition of general warrants to two arguably di-
visible clauses had no clear precedent in colonial practice.81 
History has thus identified the question of the relationship of 
the amendment's clauses, but has not provided an answer. In one 
historical study, Professor Taylor endorses the blank-check ap-
proach and asserts that the amendment was intended as a condem-
nation of general warrants and an approval of special warrants.82 
Beyond this preference for special warrants, Professor Taylor ob-
many minds upon the decision to disapprove particular practices does not signify 
the least agreement to approve other practices not upon the agenda." Id. 
78 See N. LAssoN, supra note 54, at 80-81. In addition, the Declaration of Rights 
of the Massachusetts Constitution was the first to use the term "unreasonable 
searches and seizures." Id. at 82. 
79 See id. at 81 n.11. Section l 0 of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights 
provided 
[t]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, 
and possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants 
without oaths or affirmation first made, affording a sufficient foundation 
for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or 
required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, 
his or their property, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be 
granted. 
Id. Lasson asserts that "[t]he word 'unreasonable' is imputed" into the first clause 
by virtue of the description of a permissible search contained in the second clause. 
Id. 
so See T. TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 42; see also supra note 79 (text of Pennsylvania 
provision). 
81 The Massachusetts provision, which split the right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and the specific warrant requirements into two separate sentences, 
came the closest to the configuration adopted by the framers of the fourth amend-
ment. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 38-39; see also T. TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 
42 (Massachusetts Constitution provides clearest antecedent to fourth 
amendment). 
82 See T. TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 41-44. 
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serves, the framers had nothing to say about broad rights of privacy 
or security from governmental intrusion.83 Thus, he maintains, the 
reasonableness clause authorizes the judiciary to find searches "rea-
sonable" even when the warrant clause is not satisfied. 84 Another 
legal historian, Jacob Landynsky, characterizes Taylor's view as 
"clearly" unfaithful to the intended meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.85 Landynsky follows the bright-line approach and argues that 
the warrant clause defines and emphasizes the first clause by identi-
fying "the kind of search that is not unreasonable"-namely, one 
carried out under the safeguards provided by a special warrant. 86 
In over 100 years of interpreting the fourth amendment, 87 the 
Supreme Court has split along the same lines as the legal historians. 
The judicial split has been a shifting one;88 the Court has moved 
through various stages, first emphasizing reasonableness, then ad-
vocating the primacy of the warrant clause. Ultimately, in Winston, 
the Court once again recognized the dominance of the reasonable-
ness clause. 
II. THE INITIAL PRIMACY OF THE REASONABLENESS CLAUSE-
THE BLANK CHECK IS ACCEPTED 
In the first important search-and-seizure case, Boyd v. United 
83 Id. at 43. 
84 Id. at 39, 41. 
85 See]. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 43. 
86 Id. Landynski rejects the view that "the constitutionality of a search may . 
be determined by its 'reasonableness,' regardless of whether it was conducted 
under warrant." Id. He argues "that the Fourth Amendment made no provision for 
the warrantless search." Id. at 43-44. In addition, he asserts, "It would be strange 
. . . for the amendment to specify stringent warrant requirements, after having in 
effect negated these by authorizing judicially unsupervised 'reasonable' searches 
without warrant." Id. at 44. But see infra notes 113-126 and accompanying text 
(Supreme Court permits reasonable warrantless searches). 
87 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) was the first significant fourth 
amendment case. See]. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 49. The Supreme Court rarely 
considered the fourth amendment prior to Boyd because criminal cases were not 
made appealable to the Court until 1891. Id. Landynski cites only four occasions 
on which the Court construed the search-and-seizure provisions of the Federal 
Constitution. See id. at 49 n.3 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); Den 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285-86 (1855); 
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 448, 452 (1806)). 
88 The reasonableness clause/warrant clause controversy has "provoked strong 
and fluctuating differences of view on the Court." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 
217, 235 (1960). Indeed, one commentator has referred to it as an "embarrassing 
chapter of supreme judicial schizophrenia." Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unex-
pected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 
1052 (1975). 
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States, 89 the Supreme Court rendered one of the most expansive 
readings ever given the fourth amendment. The "search" con-
strued in Boyd possessed none of the characteristics of a general 
warrant and in fact was not even a traditional search; it was an 
order issued for the production of a single, particularly described 
document.90 The order fully complied with the procedural re-
quirements of the warrant clause: it was issued by a judicial of-
ficer, it contained a particular description of the item to be 
seized, and there was no general rummaging through the appel-
lant's private papers.91 In fact, no physical trespass occurred at 
all.92 Finding no procedural defects in the issuance of the order, 
the Boyd Court considered whether compelled production of a 
document constituted an unreasonable seizure within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment.93 The Court found the order un-
reasonable, holding that the government's power to seize 
contraband did not extend to mere evidence of a crime.94 The 
Court also declared that the fourth and fifth amendments to-
gether prohibited the forcible extortion of a man's private papers 
in order to incriminate him.95 
Boyd may well be "bad" law in a technical sense. The 
Supreme Court's reasoning was historically unsound and logi-
cally questionable, particularly the nebulous relationship drawn 
between the fourth and the fifth amendments.96 In fact, during 
the century or so since the case was decided, the Boyd holding has 
been trimmed, modified, limited, and perhaps overruled sub 
silentio.97 Nevertheless, Boyd remains historically important be-
89 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
90 See id. at 618. Boyd was not even a criminal case; it was a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding. See id. at 617. 
91 See id. at 618-19. 
92 See id. at 618. The defendant voluntarily complied with the order, which re-
quired the production of an invoice for a shipment of plate glass. Id. 
93 See id. at 622. The Court held forced compliance with the order equivalent lo 
the issuance of a search warrant. Id. 
94 See id. at 622-23. 
95 See id. at 633-35. The Court noted "the intimate relation between the two 
amendments." Id. at 633. Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley declared 
that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the 
owner of goods sought to be forfeited . . . is compelling him to be a 
witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to 
the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an 
unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 634-35. 
96 See generally Note, supra note 6, at 946-48 (criticizing rationale of Boyd). 
!l7 The Federal Government has argued that Boyd was overruled by United States 
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cause it presented the Court with its first opportunity to choose 
between the blank-check and the bright-line approaches to the 
fourth amendment. The Boyd Court could easily have limited the 
fourth amendment's protection to the abuse it was designed to 
prevent-the general warrant-thus rendering the amendment 
"a dead letter. " 98 In rejecting that extremely limited construc-
tion, however, the Court perhaps took an overly expansive view 
of its power to interpret the amendment. The Court stated that 
the fundamental principles of the amendment "apply to all inva-
sions, on the part of the government and its employes of the 
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."99 Thus, the 
Court demonstrated that the fourth amendment contained more 
than a simple prescription for proper warrants. Although all of 
the procedures of the warrant clause might be satisfied, a search 
could still be invalidated because of the substantive right of privacy 
embodied in the reasonableness clause. 
Thirty-five years later, the Court followed Boyd's substantive 
approach in Gouled v. United States. 100 In that case, the Court held 
that a search warrant could not be used to enter a man's dwelling 
"solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be 
used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding." 101 The 
Court declared that such a search was unreasonable, although a 
similar warrant and search would be proper to seize contraband 
or the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. 102 In practice, the au-
thorities easily evaded this "mere evidence" rule, as it came to be 
called, 103 but it remained sound constitutional theory until 1967, 
when it was overturned by the case of Warden, Maryland Peniten-
tiary v. Hayden. 104 
The Hayden case exposed some of the logical flaws of the 
Boyd opinion and overturned the "mere evidence" rule, finding it 
v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). See United States v. (Under Seal), 745 F.2d 834, 839 
(4th Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom. United States v. Doe, 105 S. Ct. 1861 (1985). In 
Doe, the Court held that the prosecution could compel the production of the busi-
ness documents of a sole proprietorship if it provided an accompanying grant of 
use immunity. See Doe, 465 U.S. at 617. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit stated that 
Boyd had limited but continuing vitality. See (Under Seal), 745 F.2d at 839. 
98 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
99 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. · 
100 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
IOI Id. at 309. 
102 See id. 
103 See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47, 70-71 
(1974). 
104 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
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"wholly irrational." 105 The Court observed that the rule rested 
on the premise that the fourth amendment existed solely to pro-
tect the right to private property. 106 Thus, under the rule, the 
government could seize only that property in which it had a supe-
rior possessory interest. 107 The Hayden Court clearly rejected 
this property-rights premise, stating "that the principal object of 
the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than 
property." 108 The Court declared that the government's power 
to seize items did not depend upon a superior possessory right; 
rather, it existed "for the purpose of obtaining evidence which 
would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals.'' 109 
Hayden thus marked a dramatic shift from the concept of 
"substantive" reasonableness and the notion that the fourth 
amendment placed certain items beyond the search-and-seizure 
power of the government. 110 By eliminating the "substantive" 
distinction between mere evidence and items such as contraband, 
the Court insulated governmental searches from attacks based on 
the nature of the items seized. 111 With this ruling, the Court 
turned away from reliance on the broad language of the reasona-
bleness clause and began emphasizing the procedural reqmre-
ments of the warrant clause. 112 
Ill. THE PRIMACY OF THE WARRANT CLAUSE-THE BLANK 
CHECK BOUNCES 
The Boyd case rejected the simplistic view that the reasona-
bleness of a search always depends upon the existence of a war-
105 Id. at 302. 
106 See id. at 303. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 304. 
109 Id. at 306. 
I Io The Court recognized that there might be items "whose very nature pre-
cludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure." Id. at 303. 
In addition, Justice Douglas maintained that the fourth amendment had created 
substantive zones of privacy, which could not be invaded no matter how valid the 
government's need to search and no matter how painstakingly the authorities com-
plied with the procedures of the warrant clause. See id. at 321 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). But see infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text (discussion of Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)). 
111 See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 306. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted, 
"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of 
privacy whether the search is for 'mere evidence' or for fruits, instrumentalities or 
contraband." Id. at 306-07. 
I 12 See id. The Court noted, for example, that the state must still demonstrate 
probable cause "to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular appre-
hension or conviction." Id. at 307. 
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rant. In Boyd, the Court acknowledged that a procedurally 
proper warrant did not necessarily render a search constitutional. 
Shortly thereafter, the Court recognized the converse-certain 
searches may be reasonable even in the absence of a warrant. For 
example, in Weeks v. United States, 113 the Court first stated that a 
warrant was unnecessary when a suspect was searched as an inci-
dent of a lawful arrest. 114 Subsequently, in 1925, Carroll v. United 
States 115 permitted police officers to search an automobile with-
out a warrant. 116 
The Weeks Court maintained that the right to search incident 
to arrest had existed at common law to protect the lives of the 
arresting officers, to prevent the suspect's escape, and to prevent 
the prisoner from destroying evidence. 117 Thirteen years after 
Weeks, the Supreme Court extended the right to search a prisoner 
and his immediate vicinity incident to a lawful arrest to include 
"all parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose." 118 Still 
later, the Court stretched the search-incident-to-arrest rationale 
to the breaking point in Harris v. United States. 119 The Harris Court 
upheld a very extensive warrantless search 120 and also brought 
the warrant clause/reasonableness clause conflict into sharp fo-
cus, 121 demonstrating that there was no clear historical answer to 
the controversy. 122 
In Harris, several FBI agents arrested the defendant in his 
dwelling. 123 The agents possessed a valid arrest warrant, but 
113 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
114 See id. at 392. 
115 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
116 See id. at 149. 
117 See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
118 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927). 
119 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
120 See id. at 149-50. 
121 See id. at 165-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
122 See id. at 157-63 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice White has recognized 
the problem inherent in a historical analysis of search-and-seizure questions: 
[T]his Court has often looked to the common law in evaluating the rea-
sonableness, for Fourth Amendment purposes, of police activity .... 
On the other hand, it "has not simply frozen into constitutional law 
those law enforcement practices that existed at the time of the Fourth 
Amendment's passage." ... Because of sweeping change in the legal 
and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in [some] 
case[s] would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a 
historical inquiry. 
Tennessee v. Gamer, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1702 (1985) (citations omitted). 
123 Harris, 331 U.S. at 148. 
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they lacked a search warrant. 124 Harris was handcuffed, and the 
Federal agents then spent five hours searching the entire apart-
ment for stolen checks. 125 The majority upheld the search as an 
extension of the common law right to search a suspect incident to 
a lawful arrest. 126 The dissenters, however, cited the more imme-
diate history leading to the adoption of the fourth amendment: 
The Court today has resurrected and approved, in effect, 
the use of the odious general warrant or writ of assistance, 
presumably outlawed forever from our society by the Fourth 
Amendment. A warrant of arrest, without more, is now suffi-
cient to justify an unlimited search of a man's home from cel-
lar to garret for evidence of any crime, provided only that he is 
arrested in his home. Probable cause for the search need not 
be shown; an oath or affirmation is unnecessary; no descrip-
tion of the place to be searched or the things to be seized need 
be given; and the magistrate's judgment that these require-
ments have been satisfied is now dispensed with. In short, all 
the restrictions put upon the issuance and execution of search 
warrants by the Fourth Amendment are now dead letters as to 
those who are arrested in their homes. 127 
Having sanctioned an extensive ransacking without a warrant in 
the Harris decision, the Court then veered in the opposite direction 
when the case of Trupiano v. United States 128 prohibited the seizure of 
objects in plain view at the time of an arrest. 129 The Court rejected 
reasonableness as the appropriate test and announced that 
[i]t is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law 
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants 
wherever reasonably practicable .... To provide the neces-
sary security against unreasonable intrusions upon the private 
lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment re-
quired adherence to judicial processes wherever possible. 130 
Despite this statement, Trupiano recognized that the police could un-
dertake very limited warrantless searches. 131 These searches, how-
1 24 See id. at 148-49. 
125 See id. A total of five FBI agents participated in the search. Id. Although they 
were looking for stolen checks, they discovered a sealed envelope containing 
forged selective-service documents. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted 
of unlawful possession and alteration of draft-registration certificates and classifica-
tion cards. Id. at 146 n. l. 
120 See id. at 151-52. 
127 Id. at 183 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
128 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
12!1 See id. at 703-04, 710. 
13o Id. at 705. 
131 See id. at 708. 
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ever, could not be justified by a nebulous standard of 
reasonableness, but only by a necessary and practical exception to 
the requirements of the warrant clause. 132 Thus, Trupiano repre-
sented one of the Court's strongest endorsements of the primacy of 
the warrant clause. Unfortunately, the Court's holding survived for 
only two years. 
In United States v. Rabinowitz, 133 the Court overruled Trupiano 
and rejected the standards of the warrant clause in favor of a reason-
ableness test. 134 The Court conceded that the warrant clause pro-
vided bright-line guidance. 135 Indeed, the Court observed, 
"requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever prac-
ticable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administra-
tion." 136 The majority preferred the blank-check approach, 
however, so that "[s]ome flexibility [would] be accorded law officers 
engaged in daily battle with criminals." 137 Thus, the Court em-
braced the inherently flexible and nebulous reasonableness test as 
the ultimate standard, holding that reasonableness "depends upon 
the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case." 138 
This totality-of-the-circumstances test precluded any attempt at 
formulating bright lines and amounted to an "I know it when I see 
it" school of jurisprudence. 139 In a bitter dissent in Rabinowitz, Jus-
tice Frankfurter charged that the majority had disregarded the his-
torical context of the fourth amendment and employed its own 
shifting notions of reasonableness. 140 The Court subsequently 
132 See id. For example, the Court stated that the right to search a suspect as an 
incident of a lawful arrest "grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation." 
Id. 
133 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
134 See id. at 66. 
135 See id. at 65. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 66. 
13!! See Bacigal, supra note 4, at 793; see also Weinreb, supra note 103, at 57 
(describing this approach as a cataloging of facts followed by an unconnected con-
clusion regarding the search's reasonableness); White, The Fourth Amendment as a 
Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sur. CT. REV. 165, 
17 l ("We may be on the threshold of a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in which 
the only question is whether the Supreme Court believes a police practice to be 
'reasonable.' No one can know what meaning will be given such a term .... "). 
I.JO See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 86 (Frankfurter,]., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter 
stated: 
One cannot wrench "unreasonable searches" from the text and context 
and historic content of the Fourth Amendment. It was the answer of the 
Revolutionary statesmen to the evils of searches without warrants and 
searches with warrants unrestricted in scope. Both were deemed "un-
reasonable." ... When the Fourth Amendment outlawed "unreasona-
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shifted to Justice Frankfurter's view and conceded that reasonable-
ness based on the totality of the circumstances was little more than a 
statement of personal values. 141 Indeed, the Court recognized the 
need for "more precise analysis" 142 and decided a series of cases 
emphasizing the benefits of clear rules and procedures. 143 Nonethe-
less, the Court has periodically returned to and embraced the un-
structured reasonableness standard. 144 The history of the search-
incident-to-arrest exception thus contains conflicting support for 
both the bright-line (warrant clause) and blank-check (reasonable-
ness clause) approaches to the fourth amendment. 
Outside the search-incident-to-arrest area, the Court has 
moved strongly toward the primacy of the warrant clause and has 
come very close to overruling Boyd sub silentio. The Court seriously 
weakened Boyd by overturning the "mere evidence" rule in Hay-
den, 145 but studiously preserved the question of "whether there are 
items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from be-
ing the object of a reasonable search and seizure." 146 In Andresen v. 
Maryland, 147 the Court answered this question with a fairly definitive 
,, '' no. 
In Andresen, the government obtained a warrant to search for 
and seize a number of private papers stored in files in the defend-
ble searches" and then went on to define the very restricted authority 
that even a search warrant issued by a magistrate could give, the framers 
said with all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is "unreason-
able" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by 
absolute necessity. 
Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
141 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969). 
142 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969). 
14 3 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Aguilar's two-pronged test pro-
vided a bright-line approach to the assessment of the sufficiency of an informant's 
tip. See id. at 114-15; see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-17 (1969) 
(applying Aguilar's dual requirements of reliability and a statement of underlying 
circumstances). The Court abandoned this bright line in favor of the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
144 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741-42, 743-44 (1985); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-38 (1967). Chief Justice Rehnquist has ex-
plained the Court's preference for the flexible reasonableness standard as follows: 
"Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ... and very little that we 
might say here can usefully refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to 
evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as this." Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973). On another occasion, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed 
that "[ o Jur entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines' the way hounds attack 
foxes." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
145 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
1·Hi Hayden, 387 U.S. at 303. 
147 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
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ant's law office. 148 The Supreme Court upheld the search, 149 ana-
lyzing the issue in sharp contrast to the rationale of Boyd. 150 The 
Court indicated that however private and incriminating the contents 
of the documents might be, only the warrant clause's requirements 
affected the government's ability to obtain such evidence. 151 The 
Court thus viewed the fourth amendment as a relative guarantee 
that the government would not seize items without justification or in 
a procedurally improper manner. No material or communication of 
any kind was absolutely protected from procedurally proper searches 
and seizures; the procedural safeguards of the warrant clause had 
become the exclusive means of shielding personal privacy. 152 
Andresen took the warrant clause to the height of its dominance, 
while the substantive aspects of the reasonableness clause were con-
fined to footnotes promising a higher level of protection for dia-
ries. 153 The lower courts have not taken these footnotes seriously, 
and even personal diaries have been seized pursuant to a procedur-
ally correct warrant. 154 The Andresen Court thus approved the very 
type of search condemned in Boyd and indeed rejected most of that 
decision's rationale. Boyd had disregarded the procedural aspects of 
the warrant clause and had focused on the substantive content of 
the reasonableness clause. 155 In contrast, Andresen denied the exist-
ence of any substantive content to the reasonableness clause and 
focused solely on the procedural requirements of the warrant 
clause. 156 The pendulum would swing one mpre time, however, and 
erode the primacy of the warrant clause. The Court's recognition of 
a balancing-of-interests approach to the fourth amendment would 
t 48 Id. at 466. 
149 See id. at 477, 484. 
150 See id. at 471-74. 
151 See id. at 473-74. The Court stated, 
"There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other 
forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if 
only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which 
other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the 
affidavit and warrant." 
Id. at 474 (quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309-(1921)). 
152 See Note, supra note 6, at 978, 979; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 400 (1976) (warrant clause, rather than fifth amendment, was framers' vehicle 
for protection of personal privacy). 
1:;~ See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976) ("Special 
problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary . . . 
are not involved here."). 1 
1'14 See, e.g., People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 740-41, 497 P.2d 1121, 1141, 102 
Cal. Rptr. 385, 405 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973). 
I:;:; See supm notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing Boyd). 
I :;i; See s11/1m notes 150-152 and accompanying text (discussing .-lndresen). 
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ultimately lead it to the Winston decision and a complete re-examina-
tion of the substantive content of the reasonableness clause. 
IV. THE RETURN OF REASONABLENESS 
The reasonableness clause as a flexible standard and the 
warrant clause as a comparatively rigid and uniform standard 
represent distinct views of the fourth amendment. The Court's 
recognition of a sliding scale of probable cause, however, has 
blurred the distinction between the two standards. This sliding 
scale has added to the warrant clause the flexibility that previ-
ously had been unique to the reasonableness standard. Prior to 
Camara v. Municipal Court 157 and Terry v. Ohio, 158 the reasonable-
ness clause had been used to excuse the absence of a warrant, but 
not the lack of probable cause. The Court had stated, "In cases 
where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing 
officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the 
court [he has] probable cause." 159 Regardless of whether the 
search was made pursuant to a warrant, probable cause remained 
the uniform connecting thread between the warrant and reasona-
bleness clauses. "[S]eizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by 
probable cause," 160 the Court maintained, and however great or 
slight the invasion, or however pressing the community interest 
at stake, probable cause "require[d] a uniform quantum of pre-
search information for every search and seizure." 161 
In Camara and Terry, the Court rejected the notion that prob-
able cause was a uniform, bright-line standard deduced from the 
language of the fourth amendment. 162 Instead, the Court 
adopted the view that the probable cause standard is a method of 
accommodating the opposing interests of the government and 
individual citizens. 163 The Court recognized that different situa-
tions call for different accommodations. 164 Thus, varying levels 
of probable cause might sometimes be appropriate. 165 This con-
cept of a variable standard of probable cause has become as ftexi-
157 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
158 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
159 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). 
160 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 (1979). 
161 Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 
U. Cm. L. REV. 664, 680 (1961). 
162 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-19; Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-36, 539. 
163 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 22-27; Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. 
lfi4 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. 
165 See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39. 
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ble and nebulous as the reasonableness standard; 166 in fact, the 
two standards are essentially the same. rn7 The Court employs 
only one methodology-a balancing of conflicting governmental 
and individual interests-to determine whether a search is consti-
tutional. It makes no difference "whether the balancing is done 
merely to determine what is reasonable or to determine what 
level of probable cause is required." 168 
This balancing-of-interests approach to probable cause ne-
cessitates the same type of substantive value judgments implicit 
in the reasonableness clause. Under the balancing approach, the 
Court determines whether probable cause exists by comparing 
the magnitude of the conflicting governmental and individual in-
terests.169 When these interests are at odds, the Court must iden-
tify the underlying societal values, attach relative weights to these 
166 In place of a rigid definition of probable cause as a "reasonable belief," the 
Court has used a number of terms. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 882 (1975) ("reasonable suspicion"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770 (1966) ("clear indication"). But see United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3310-11 (1985) (Court denied that "clear indication" was 
a distinct standard of justification for intrusions upon privacy). 
The lower courts have also used various terms to describe the required level of 
probable cause. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 
1967) ("real suspicion"); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 
1966) ("[s]ome knowledge"); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 497 P.2d 1121, 
1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 (1972) ("mere possibility"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 
(1973); People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 219, 352 N.E.2d 562, 569-70, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 382-83 (1976) (nonwhimsical suspicion). Of course, the important 
constitutional consideration is the distinction between mere suspicion and reasonable 
suspicion, or between mere belief and reasonable belief. The concept of reasonable-
ness is the significant legal determination; references to belief, suspicion, and justi-
fication are mere surplus. 
167 This approach involves a certain amount of tail chasing. To define reasona-
bleness, the Court sometimes looks to the warrant clause, and in defining the prob-
able cause requirement of the warrant clause, the Court looks back to the 
reasonableness clause. In the words of Justice White, "In cases in which the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable cause' is the 
standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional 
mandate of reasonableness." Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. 
168 Lafave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Be-
yond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 56 n.86 (1968). In addition, Justice Brennan contends 
that there is no need for "the amorphous 'reasonableness under all the circum-
stances' standard" in' light of the flexible probable cause test announced in Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See New Jersey v. T.L.0., 105 S. Ct. 733, 756 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
16!> See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. Once the Court interprets the 
amendment as protecting values beyond the public's interest in being free of gen-
eral warrants and writs of assistance, some ordering of social values is essential; all 
cannot be given equal weight. Recognition of a hierarchy of fourth amendment 
values and the need to balance these. values simply acknowledges that "we must 
consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have, and make up our 
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values, and strike the constitutionally appropriate balance. In 
theory, the sliding scale of probable cause improves upon the 
nebulous reasonableness standard by providing three criteria for 
identifying constitutional searches: (1) the weight of the govern-
mental interest justifying the intrusion, (2) the severity of the in-
trusion into an individual's privacy, and (3) the feasibility of 
alternative procedures. 170 A close analysis of the Court's applica-
tion of these three factors, however, reveals little more than a 
series of ad hoc determinations of reasonableness based on the 
totality of the circumstances. 
The first factor, determining the value of the government's 
interest, presents an almost infinite range of governmental justifi-
cations for intruding upon individual privacy. 171 For example, in 
noncriminal situations, the justifications range from photograph-
ing political demonstrators 172 to protecting underprivileged chil-
dren. 173 Similarly, alleged governmental interests in the 
traditional criminal context vary from checking for violations of 
automobile registration laws 174 to apprehending vicious murder-
ers.175 In order to be effective, the fourth amendment's balancing 
process must somehow define the legitimate governmental inter-
minds which to choose." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
170 See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-39. The Court in Camara made only passing 
reference to the third factor, alternative procedures. See id. at 537. In addition, the 
Court noted a fourth factor: "a long history of judicial and public acceptance." Id. 
This final factor is of dubious validity and weight. See Lafave, supra note 168, at 42-
43. But cf United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 41l,416-22 (1976) (emphasizing his-
torical acceptance of practice of arresting suspected felons in public without a 
warrant). 
171 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (government possesses interest in deterring 
criminal behavior); People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 255, 294 P.2d 13, 15 (1956) 
(interest in curbing "the juvenile problem"); People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 63, 
238 N.E.2d 307, 313, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 906 (1968) (government may assist inno-
cent citizens in clearing themselves of suspicion), vacated sub nom. Morales v. New 
York, 396 U.S. 102 (1969); Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 
ALA. L. REV. 287, 298 n.44 (1971) (police may maintain moral equilibrium-rang-
ing from helping drunks to harassing prostitutes); Reich, Police Questioning of Law 
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE LJ. 1161, 1167 (1966) (acquiring information with which 
to lobby the legislature). 
172 See Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), ajf'd, 465 F.2d 196 
(4th Cir. 1972). In that case, the court stated, "It has long been the policy in Rich-
mond and other places throughout the nation to photograph persons participating 
in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities, whether peaceful or 
otherwise." Id. at 309. The court noted that such a "practice serves as a deterrent 
to violence and vandalism." Id. 
173 See Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971). 
174 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979). 
175 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 
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ests and assign a relative value to each one. To date, the 
Supreme Court has offered little meaningful guidance as to what 
considerations are relevant in assessing the government's pur-
ported interest. Although the Court has at times concluded that 
a governmental interest is "legitimate and weighty," 176 "ur-
gent," 177 or "vital," 178 it has failed to identify the standards it 
uses to reach these conclusions. 
The second factor under the sliding-scale approach is an as-
sessment of the severity of the government's intrusion into an 
individual's privacy. By requiring a higher level of probable 
cause, the law affirms the dignity of the individual and displays 
respect for a particular form of privacy. Unfortunately, the Court 
has never offered a satisfactory or workable definition of the con-
stitutional right of privacy. 179 The Court has spoken of the sever-
ity of intrusions upon privacy only in conclusory terms, 180 and it 
is no wonder that the process of assigning weights to the various 
privacy interests has not yielded any bright-line rules. Further-
more, when the Court speaks of "privacy" primarily as a right to 
hide seizable evidence, 181 the defendant's apparent guilt has ob-
viously influenced the assessment of how much constitutional 
protection he should receive. 182 
The third aspect of the balancing approach requires a deter-
mination of the feasibility of alternative procedures. Simply 
stated, this factor recognizes that a governmental infringement 
upon individual privacy may be deemed unreasonable because a 
710, 738-39, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 (1972), cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 947 (1973). 
176 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110. 
177 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). 
178 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (l 979). 
179 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). The Katz Court warned 
that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 
'right to privacy.'" Id. Indeed, the Court noted that "protection of a person's gen-
eral right to privacy ... is ... left largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 
350-51 (footnotes omitted); see also Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 275, 275-76 (1974) ("no consensus in the legal and philosophical literature on 
a definition of privacy"). 
180 See, e.g., Mimms, 434 U.S. at 11 l. The Mimms Court characterized a motorist's 
interest in remaining in his vehicle as de minimis because "[t]he driver is being 
asked to expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed.'' Id. 
181 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815-16 (1984); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (White,J., plurality opinion). 
182 In considering whether the defendant's obvious guilt should be a factor in 
interpreting the amendment, it is important to remember that "it was . . . the un-
restrained search for smuggled goods that brought the Fourth Amendment into be-
ing." J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 54, at 57 (emphasis added). 
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less intrusive alternative existed, which could have accomplished 
the same end at a lower cost to individual privacy. Most often, 
the Court has disposed of this factor in a conclusory, one-sen-
tence reference to the lack of practical alternatives. 183 
In Winston, however, the Court devoted considerable atten-
tion to this question. 184 More specifically, the Court examined 
the prosecution's case and determined whether there was a 
"compelling need" for the removal of a bullet from the defend-
ant's body or whether the prosecution had access to sufficient al-
ternative methods of meeting its burden of proof. 185 The Court's 
approach to this question hooked the prosecutor on the horns of 
a dilemma: If the evidence is sufficient to establish a high degree 
of likelihood that the item subject to seizure is present in the de-
183 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (doubtful that 
techniques other than area inspections would detect building-code violations); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood test only effective 
method of obtaining evidence of blood-alcohol content); cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (Court concluded that alternative mechanisms were avail-
able to detect unlicensed drivers). 
184 See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1619-20. 
185 See id. The Court derived the "compelling need" standard from Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1616-18. In Schmerber, the 
Court permitted the forced taking of a blood sample from a motorist suspected of 
drunken driving. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The Court relied on several fac-
tors, including the relative safety of the blood-test procedure and the "clear indica-
tion" that evidence of drunken driving was present in the defendant's body. See id. 
at 770-71. In addition, however, the Court noted that a blood test "is a highly 
effective means of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence 
of alcohol." Id. at 771. Furthermore, the Court observed that a person's blood-
alcohol content diminishes rapidly as time passes. See id. at 770. Therefore, the 
Court reasoned, important evidence might be lost if the state were required to un-
dertake the time-consuming task of obtaining a warrant. See id. at 770-71. 
In Winston, Justice Brennan asserted that the Schmerber Court had relied on "the 
difficulty of proving drunkenness by other means" in concluding that the blood test 
was "of vital importance" to the prosecution's case. See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1618. 
He emphasized the lack of a similar urgency in the Winston case, pointing to the 
"substantial additional evidence" available to the state. Id. at 1619. Justice Bren-
nan concluded his analysis of this issue by establishing the new "compelling need" 
standard: 
[A)lthough the bullet may turn out to be useful to the Commonwealth in 
prosecuting [Lee], the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a com-
pelling need for it. We believe that in these circumstances the Com-
monwealth has failed to demonstrate that it would be "reasonable" . . . 
to search for evidence of this crime by means of the contemplated 
surgery. 
Id. at 1620. Clearly, Justice Brennan's language indicates that the state must meet a 
heavy burden in order to justify compelled conventional surgery. As the Winston 
opinion indicates, however, intrusions into the body require case-by-case analysis. 
See id. at 1616. Thus, the "compelling need" test may not apply to blood tests, X 
rays, or arthroscopic techniques. 
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fendant's body, then this same evidence, when presented to the 
fact-finder at trial, should circumstantially establish the location 
of the bullet; thus, there is no compelling need actually to re-
move the bullet. 186 Because the prosecution had a strong enough 
case without the bullet, the Court concluded that the state lacked 
the justification necessary for such an extrerr.ie intrusion into the 
privacy of the defendant's body. 187 
Although the Court's estimate of the strength of the prose-
cution's case proved to be accurate, 188 such an assessment was 
possible only because of the unique posture of the Winston case. 
The defendant in Winston had been afforded a complete adver-
sarial hearing prior to the search. 189 In normal situations, how-
ever, courts deal with completed searches, and they must assess 
only those facts known to the magistrate or the police officer at 
the time of the search.190 Magistrates and police officers cannot 
possibly evaluate what contribution a particular piece of evidence 
will make to the likelihood of a conviction because they are privy 
to neither the prosecution's case nor the defendant's case. 191 
186 See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1619. The Court also questioned whether the bullet 
would be useful for ballistic testing "because the bullet's markings may have been 
corroded in the time that the bullet has been in'respondent's shoulder." Id. at 1619 
n.10. 
187 See id. at 1620. Similarly, in another recent case, the Court stated that the 
killing of a nonviolent suspect was not a sufficiently productive means of accom-
plishing law enforcement goals. See Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1705-06 
(1985). In Garner, a police officer had observed that a fleeing burglary suspect was 
young, slightly built, and unarmed. Id. at 1697. In addition, the officer had viewed 
the suspect's face with the aid of a flashlight, and the suspect was attempting to 
escape on foot. See id. Nonetheless, the policeman shot and killed the youth when 
he persisted in his attempt to escape. Id. The Court held that such a use of deadly 
force to apprehend an unarmed suspect was unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 170 l. Although the Court did not apply Winston, it could easily have 
concluded that the police possessed sufficient alternative means to effect the cap-
ture of the suspect, including the officer's description and the immediate use of a 
police radio to enlist a number of patrol cars in the search for the youth, who had 
no apparent access to a vehicle. 
188 The defendant was convicted based on other evidence. See Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Apr. 24, 1985, at Al, col. l. 
18!1 See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at 1618 & n.6. The Court refused to decide whether 
such a hearing was constitutionally required. See supra note 30 and accompanying 
text. 
l!lo See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 566-67 
(1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). In certain limited situations, how-
ever, a court may inquire into facts not contained in the affidavit supporting a re-
quest for a search warrant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 ( 1978). 
1!11 Hindsight judgment based on what occurs at trial should not be used to assess 
the necessity for evidence at the time the search occurs. For example, one com-
mentator has fallen into the trap of arguing that the government's need to search in 
a particular case was de minimis because the seized evidence was merely used to 
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Thus, consideration of the government's compelling need for a 
particular piece of evidence is not feasible in the vast majority of 
search-and-seizure cases. Absent the unusual circumstances of 
Winston, this aspect of the balancing test is likely to play a minor 
part in fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
The balancing approach to the fourth amendment requires 
the Court to weigh values within the three distinct categories of 
governmental interests, individual privacy, and alternative proce-
dures.192 Beyond that initial task, however, lies the difficult prob-
lem of incorporating the three variables into a common formula 
that creates some basis for comparison. Since the adoption of 
the sliding-scale approach, the Court has analyzed governmental 
interests by referring to "legitimate" governmental power; it has 
evaluated the nature of an intrusion under the rubric of individ-
ual privacy; and it has considered the feasibility of alternatives in 
terms of efficiency and economy. The mystery of how these dis-
tinct lines of analysis interrelate, however, remains unsolved. 
The goal of achieving flexibility through the balancing ap-
proach may be infinitely sensible in that it seeks to correlate the 
importance of the governmental interest with the severity of the 
intrusion upon privacy. 193 Until a precise methodology for inter-
weaving all three factors is articulated, however, fourth amend-
ment decisions will continue to appear unprincipled. At present, 
the selection and description of the factors to be weighed largely 
determine the outcome of any balancing process. 194 When the 
Court announces that an "important and weighty" governmental 
corroborate what the defendant conceded at trial. See Note, Fourth Amendment Bal-
ancing and Searches into the Body, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1504, 1515 (l 977). This type of 
Monday-morning quarterbacking ignores the fact that at the time of the search the 
government had no way of knowing what, if anything, the defendant would concede 
at trial. 
1 !12 See supra notes 169-191 and accompanying text (discussing the three catego-
ries). Our new Chief justice has noted that these categories should remain distinct. 
See Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law 
Enforcement?, 23 KAN. L. REV. I, 13-14 (1974). As his article states, "for purposes of 
evaluation it is both possible and necessary to arrange the privacy and the govern-
mental interests on separate continuums." Id. at 14. 
l!I~ See People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 222-23, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 384-85 (1976); see also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 
1094-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (magnitude of governmental interest determines level of 
probable cause necessary for intrusion). 
1!14 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 890 (1975) (Douglas, J .. 
concurring). Justice Douglas stated that "by specifying factors to be considered 
without attempting to explain what combination is necessary Lo satisfy the test, the 
Court may actually induce the police to push its language beyond intended limits." 
Id. 
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interest will be balanced against a "de minimis" interest in pri-
vacy, 195 the result is preordained. So long as the Court continues 
to approach the fourth amendment "in a totally ad hoc fashion," 
considering "any number of subjective factors," 196 no bright-line 
rules are likely to emerge. 197 
CONCLUSION 
Of course, no bright-line rule can be drafted to cover all pos-
sible factual situations. Courts reason by analogy, and any rule 
can be evaded or modified by a careful consideration of the dif-
ferent facts present in each case. In addition, a court may be 
tempted to argue that the procedures actually employed consti-
tuted the "functional equivalent" of the bright-line rule. Justice 
Powell's concurring opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman, 198 for 
example, demonstrates how the bright-line rules of the warrant 
clause can be eroded by a result-oriented court. 199 The majority 
in Opperman upheld the constitutionality of an intrusion into an 
automobile even in the absence of a warrant or a prior determi-
nation of probable cause. 200 The police inventory of the im-
pounded automobile satisfied none of the bright-line 
requirements of the warrant clause: there was no warrant, no 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained any seizable 
item, and no specificity regarding the area to be searched or the 
item to be seized.201 Nonetheless, the majority ignored the war-
rant clause and upheld the search under the general heading of 
reasonableness. 202 
Justice Powell disdained this blank-check approach, but 
195 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11. 
196 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 34 l (l 97 l) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
197 For example, the bright-line rules of standing have been replaced with the 
nebulous totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining justifiable expectations 
of privacy. Compare Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980) (applying 
totality-of-circumstances test) and United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93 
( 1980) (rejecting claim of standing because defendant lacked "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy") and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-42 (1978) (establishing 
totality-of-circumstances test) with Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 
( 1960) (automatic standing in possessory-olfense cases). 
1!18 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
l!l!I See id. at 376-84 (Powell, J., concurring). 
200 See id. at 366-67, 376. 
20 I See id. at 365-66. The police department routinely conducted inventories of 
impounded vehicles in order to secure any valuables that might be in the car. Id. at 
366. Indeed, in this case, a police officer had observed a watch lying on the dash-
board. See id. 
202 Ser. id. at 370, 373, 376. 
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reached the same result while supposedly applying the bright-
line rules of the warrant clause.203 He identified three purposes 
served by the warrant clause and found that the procedures fol-
lowed by the police officers constituted the "functional 
equivalent" of the warrant clause's requirements.204 Justice Pow-
ell asserted that the first function of a warrant is to ensure that 
the police officer does not make a discretionary and potentially 
discriminatory search for evidence of a crime, thereby substitut-
ing his judgment for that of a neutral magistrate.205 He noted, 
however, that inventories are conducted to secure valuables 
rather than to seize evidence of a crime.206 Justice Powell con-
cluded, therefore, that inventory searches for valuables pursuant 
to uniform, standardized procedures eliminate the discretion of 
the searching officer, thus alleviating the need for a warrant.207 
A second purpose of the warrant requirement, Justice Powell 
observed, is to prevent hindsight and police perjury208 from af-
fecting the evaluation of the constitutionality of a search.209 He 
maintained that inventory searches conducted in accordance with 
pre-existing police department regulations precluded any oppor-
tunity for post-search perjury by the police.21° Finally, Justice 
Powell stated that the third function of a warrant is to inform the 
citizen that the police are acting under lawful authority.211 Be-
cause the owner of the automobile is not present at the time of 
the inventory, Justice Powell reasoned, there is no need to com-
municate this assurance to him. 212 
Justice Powell thus employed a doctrine of equivalent pro-
tections, under which the constitutionality of the search de-
pended upon whether the challenged procedures provided 
adequate safeguards to compensate for noncompliance with the 
203 See id. at 381-84 (Powell, J., concurring); see also California v. Carney, 105 S. 
Ct. 2066, 2075, 2078 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (motor home may be "the 
functional equivalent" of a temporary abode such as a motel room, a vacation 
home, or a hunting-and-fishing cabin; thus, they should not be subject to automo-
bile exception to warrant requirement). 
204 See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 381-84 (Powell, J., concurring). 
205 Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring). 
2oi; See id. 
201 See id. 
208 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). The Beck Court stated, "[A]fter-the-
event justification for lhe ... search [is] too likely to be subtly influenced by the 
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Id. 
20!1 Opperman, 428 U.S. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring). 
21 o See id. 
21 I See id. al 384 (Powell, J., concurring). 
212 Id. 
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warrant clause.213 He argued that the police department's stan-
dardized regulations in Opperman served the same purpose as a 
search warrant.214 Thus, in his view, they were an acceptable re-
placement for the requirements of the warrant clause.215 
Once a bright-line rule is subject to modification on the basis 
of "functional equivalency," however, the door is open to total 
emasculation of the rule. As Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehn-
quist has noted, "Acceptance by the courts of arguments that one 
thing is the 'functional equivalent' of the other . . . soon breaks 
down what might have been a bright line into a blurry impres-
sionistic pattern."216 Of course, bright-line rules are often 
blurred in hard cases such as Winston v. Lee, which dramatically 
demonstrated the need for some flexibility. Winston tested the 
bright-line rule of Andresen that no substantive area of privacy is 
beyond the reach of a procedurally proper warrant.217 The 
Supreme Court was understandably reluctant to hold that this 
crystal-clear general principle could be used to permit such a 
"shocking" invasion of privacy.218 
If it were the nature of the intrusion that shocked the Court's 
collective conscience, however, .the Justices might better have 
turned to a due process precedent rather than resurrecting Boyd's 
substantive approach to the fourth amendment. Some thirty 
years prior to Winston, in Rochin v. California,219 the Court applied 
213 Chief Justice Vinson may have originated the concept of equivalent protec-
tions in a dissenting opinion. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 714-15 
(1948) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting). The Chief Justice objected to an insistence "upon 
the use of a search warrant in situations where the issuance of such a warrant can 
contribute nothing to the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amendment 
was intended to protect." Id. 
214 See supra notes 203-212 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Powell's 
argument). 
215 There have been numerous suggestions that police department regulations 
are superior to the exclusionary rule in controlling police conduct. See K. DAVIS, 
POLICE D1scRETION 98-131 (1975); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 417-28; McGowan, 
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 672-94 (1972). 
216 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). 
217 See supra notes 147-156 and accompanying text (discussing Andresen). 
218 See Winston, 105 S. Ct. at: 1619, 1620. Justice Brennan's description of the 
state's proposed course of action vividly conveys his sense of outrage: "[T]he 
Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to 'drug this citi-
zen-not yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a 
state of unconsciousness,' . . . and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a 
crime." Id. at 1619 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983), 
a.ff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985)). 
21 !l 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the police saw the defendant place two cap-
sules in his mouth. Id. at 166. In an attempt to secure what they believed were 
narcotics, three police officers jumped upon the defendant and unsuccessfully tried 
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the due process clause to deal with a shocking intrusion into a 
suspect's body.220 In Rochin, Justice Frankfurter formulated dis-
tinct roles for the due process clause and the fourth amendment. 
He had previously maintained that the fourth amendment was 
specifically defined by the bright-line rules of the warrant 
clause,221 but he viewed the due process clause as beyond confin-
ing and defining.222 Justice Frankfurter's view of the distinct roles 
of the fourth amendment and the due process clause presents an 
alternative approach to factual situations such as Winston. The 
due process clause can be seen as the ultimate blank check223-
the safety valve the Court needs to deal with situations that can-
not be encompassed within rigid rules.224 
The fourth amendment, in contrast, should not be inter-
preted to provide the same degree of flexibility. If the fourth 
amendment is made "responsive to every relevant shading of 
every relevant variation of every relevant complexity,"225 it will 
fail to serve its primary purpose of "regulat[ing] the police in 
their day-to-day activities."226 In order to achieve this objective, 
"the rules governing search and seizure are more in need of 
greater clarity than greater sophistication."227 In the short run, 
Winston may be hailed as a "victory" for the substantive right to 
privacy. In the long run, however, the Court's resurrection of a 
substantive content to the reasonableness clause will erode the 
certainty and predictability needed for the bright-line rules of the 
warrant clause. 
to extract the capsules. Id. The officers then handcuffed Rochin and took him to a 
hospital, where "a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin's 
stomach against his will." Id. This "stomach pumping" caused Rochin to vomit, 
and the police found two morphine capsules in the vomited matter. Id. 
220 See id. at 169-74. · 
221 See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
222 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173. For Justice Frankfurter, the relevant yardstick under 
the due process clause was "the community's sense of fair play and decency." Id. 
223 On another occasion, Justice Frankfurter characterized due process as "the 
least frozen concept of our law-the least confined to history and the most absorp-
tive of powerful social standards of a progressive society." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
224 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in IVins/011 concluded that the proposed surgery 
was "condemned by Rochin." Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983), 
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985). 
225 Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 375; see also R. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY 
197 ( 1976) ("If the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of 
them is constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy 
will be hard to draw and even harder to maintain."). 
22!i LaFave, "Casr-by-Case :ldjudication, ·· rnpm note 37, at 141. 
2'..17 l.aFave, I111pnferl ll'orld, suprn note 3 7. at 321. 
